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PROGRAM EVALUATION

ÉVALUATION des PROGRAMMES

Canada

AN EVALUATION OF KATIMAVIK:

EFFICIENCY

A Study Conducted for:
The Secretary of State

by:

Canadian Loric Consultants Ltd.,
Toronto

This study was paid for by the Secretary of State Department. Results and opinions contained therein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views or the intentions of the Secretary of State Department.

AN EVALUATION OF

KATIMAVIK: EFFICIENCY

INDEX

	PAGE
GENERAL APPROACH	1
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS	6
JOB CREATION COSTS AS ALTERNATIVES TO KATIMAVIK	12
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS	16
CONCLUSIONS	27

GENERAL APPROACH

The evaluation conducted by Canadian Loric Consultants Ltd. focused on in depth analysis of Katimavik financial and management records and interviews with key Katimavik staff. This process was followed up by a similar review of the data on programs deemed comparable and interviews with their staff.

Katimavik objectives have been to serve Canadian communities, to aid in the personal development of participants, to encourage environmental awareness, and to provide opportunities for a greater understanding of the country. It offers young people an opportunity to spend nine months living, learning, and working in different parts of Canada. Programs having somewhat similar objectives or using similar means - a combination of living, working, travelling, learning and experiencing were examined to determine whether they could appropriately be compared with Katimavik.

Programs which affected youth development and which were national in scope were examined to determine whether appropriate comparisons could be made with Katimavik. These programs were aimed at a range of objectives including social development and job creation. The programs for which

program management gave higher priority to social development objectives over job creation included Katimavik, Canada World Youth, Operation Beaver, and Open House Canada. The programs in which job creation objectives were given higher priority included the Local Employment Assistance Program, Canada Works Program, Young Canada Works Program, Canada Community Employment Development Program and similar Employment and Immigration programs operated under other titles.

Canada World Youth and Operation Beaver were considered most comparable with Katimavik because of the nature of their operations. The programs all require a commitment of time such that participants cannot be in school for most of a school year; provide community betterment through building or improving community buildings, services, or outdoor facilities; as well as attempt to get people to better understand each other and different communities and cultures. They are not designed to function in conjunction with the labour market and provide employment opportunities at or near the market or minimum wage rates as a means of combating unemployment.

Open House Canada shares the aim of getting young people to better understand other young Canadians and to gain exposure to other Canadian communities. However, it is very limited

in the extent of the exposure it provides, giving its participants less than two weeks on their Open House Canada project. It is not designed to create human capital in the form of better trained or educated individuals, nor physical capital in the form of improvements to buildings, facilities, or the environment.

Open House Canada is directed towards young people still in school. Its short duration gives them contact with people and problems in other communities but provides only a limited living experience. The participants are not supposed to view their experience in the Open House Canada project as a job, nor should they attempt to complete projects requiring planning, organization, management and weeks or months of each person's labour. Even if each Katimavik participant were limited to one project in one community, the three month duration of that project is more appropriate for setting goals, developing plans and working as an employee to complete the job. It is a more in-depth exposure. The rotations through two additional communities give the Katimavik participants the opportunity to learn from their previous experience and to apply that knowledge. Being in additional communities also gives the Katimavik participants a broader range of exposure to Canadian communities. Open House Canada strives to put a large number of people through its program and expends relatively

few dollars per person. It can be examined for the efficiency of its operation using the approach of this study. However, such results would indicate how efficiently Open House Canada has been doing on a year to year basis relative to itself. They would not provide a set of figures for relative comparison of efficiency with Katimavik.

In addition to their priority for job creation, the Employment and Immigration Canada Programs differed from Katimavik in other important aspects. The Young Canada Works and Canada Summer Youth Employment Program were directed towards students and only operated during the summer months. The Canada Works and Local Employment Assistance Programs were directed towards the unemployed of all ages. They were more than four times larger than Katimavik and were operated by full-time civil servants as part of an established government commitment to provide employment opportunities through the operation of direct job creation programs. LEAP furthermore provided for years (up to 5) of project funding in the hope that the projects could become self-sustaining and thus supply permanent employment opportunties for its client group of disadvantaged labour market participants. These programs have been frequently evaluated by outside consultants, by Employment and Immigration Canada, and by Treasury Canada. Their objective of job creation has been reflected in their design, funding

and evaluation. If Katimavik was primarily aimed at creating jobs and increasing income for low income workers, it results could be evaluated and compared with those of the job creation programs.

KATIMAVIK INTERNAL EFFICIENCY

The consultant used the financial records - internal accounting, annual reports, and audited statements - for the evaluation of Katimavik and for the comparisons with Canada World Youth and Operation Beaver. The records were augmented by interviews and discussions with management and accounting personnel in each of the programs. The financial data were categorized according to a consistent framework which broke the data into three major cost centers of Administration, Communications and Program. The data for program Year 1 to 4 of Katimavik (Year 4 data ending May 31, 1981) were compared against each other in major components of the cost centers. This internal comparison shows how Katimavik had performed relative to itself during the years examined. Categorizing Canada World Youth and Operation Beaver financial data in the same manner facilitates comparisons between the programs for the time period covered by Katimavik programs Years 1 to 4. It should be noted that during this period Katimavik was going through its beginning and developmental stages whereas Canada World Youth was

already a well-established program. It should also be noted Operation Beaver, being only 5% the size of Katimavik may be too small to benefit from economies of scale.

EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

Table 1 shows that Katimavik spends a higher percentage of its resources on program and on communications than do either of the other two programs. It spends a lower percentage, approximately half as much, as the other programs on adminsitration. Management takes care to control non-program expenditure and to direct as much of the total funds to program operation as possible. Regional office expenditures connected with the delivery of the field operations are included in program expenditures. This categorization and the data show Katimavik to be more program oriented than Canada World Youth or Operation Beaver. Canada World Youth, because of its international nature may have to center more of its management at the national level. As a result, the percentage of its total expenditure devoted to administration could be expected to be higher and its program expenditures lower than Katimavik's. Operation Beaver, being considerably smaller than the other two programs has little regional expenditure associated with program delivery or management. These functions can be performed by the national offices.

TABLE 1

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES

Year*	Administration	Communications	Program	Total
		KATIMAVIK		
1	16.9	6.0	77.1	100.0
2	15.3	4.1	80.6	100.0
3	14.7	3.7	81.6	100.0
4**	19.2	5.5	75.3	100.0
Total***	16.4	4.7	78.9	100.0
		CANADA WORLD YOUTH		
1	31.8	5.1	63.1	100.0
2	36.9	2.2	60.9	100.0
3	33.7	1.2	65.1	100.0
4	35.0	2.1	62.9	100.0
Total***	34.6	2.3	63.1	100.0
		OPERATION BEAVER		
1	47.6	10.4	42.0	100.0
2	29.5	3.4	67.1	100.0
3	28.8	2.0	69.2	100.0
4	27.3	1.6	71.1	100.0
Total***	31.5	3.6	64.9	100.0

* Year: Refers to expenditures during the appropriate Katimavik Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, and Year 4.

** Covers Katimavik expenditures to May 31, 1981. Final expenditures to the end of Year 4 will increase the percent distribution of expenditures on program by an estimated 4 percent. Estimates for the decline in administration's share is 2.8% and communications 1.2%. (Estimated from Katimavik Year 4 performance against budget and year end budget estimates.)

*** Total calculated from expenditures Years 1 to 4.

In Table 2, the expenditures are broken out by administration, communications and program.

TABLE 2

EXPENDITURES ($,000)

Year*	Administration	Communications	Program	Total
		KATIMAVIK		
1	1,415	504	6,448	8,368
2	1,400	374	7,371	9,145
3	1,561	391	8,678	10,626
4**	1,652	472	6,470	8,594
Total	6,028	1,741	28,963	36,732
		CANADA WORLD YOUTH		
1	770	123	1,530	3,423
2	1,474	87	2,434	3,996
3	1,666	59	3,225	4,950
4	1,786	108	3,212	5,107
Total	5,697	377	10,402	16,476
		OPERATION BEAVER		
1	141	31	124	295
2	149	17	338	503
3	142	10	341	492
4	153	9	399	560
Total	584	66	1,201	1,851

* Year: Refers to expenditures during the appropriate Katimavic Year 1, 2, 3, and 4.

** Covers Katimavik expenditures to May 31, 1981.

Looking at the numbers behind these aggregate figures is more revealing of what management has tried to do to make Katimavik more efficient. For travel it purchases seats at group rate discounts, flies people at student standby rates, and has tried, by using computer simulations, to minimize travel without sacrificing the objective of three rotations for all participants. In the first three years its maximum yearly travel expenditure was less than $2,000,000. Reducing the number of project locations to two per person would reduce travel costs by less than 20% but would do so at the great risk of substantially altering the nature of the program.

Expenditure on national and regional training camps declined from $901,000 in Year 1 to $196,000 in Year 4. These expenditures comprised 14%, 2%, and 3% of total expenditures categorized under program in Years 1 through 3 of Katimavik. The development and use of training materials was substituted as much as possible for large scale training camps. It was then possible to conduct training on site in the community where the first of a project's three sites was located.

Expenditure on executive management, a component of the administration category, and consisting of those executives, support personnel and associated office costs,

in the national office operation at the level of manager and above were $594,000, $302,000 and $424,000 in the first three years.

Looking at the program cost center in depth shows that the money spent on its management including national office program operations costs, regional office costs and training camps declined from 29% of the program expenditures in Year 1 to 15% of program expenditures in Year 3. In other words, using a consistent method to categorize expenditures showed that expenditures directly related to program delivery and operation increased from 71% to 85% of all program expenditures.

Katimavik has been accused of spending too much on its Board of Directors. The data indicate that it spends very little money for a body of people who are qualified to give excellent and often expert advice. Contrary to private corporations, these board members are not paid. Travel including transportation, accomodation and food comprise 93% of the total expenditure on the Board of Directors. The expenditures of the Board for transportation, accomodation and food, telephone and telex, public relations and other totalled $173,000 for the first three years of Katimavik, an amount equal to 0.6% of the total expenditure on Katimavik.

The detailed financial records supply a wealth of information. They are too detailed to be reproduced in this report or to be anlysed in their entirety as part of this evaluation. The records, together with Katimavik management's excellent co-operation, gave the consultant valuable insights into the program.

At the national level Katimavik management appears, in the consultant's view, to be making more and better use of its available data. There are two exceptions to this assessment. The Capital Improvement Assessment forms do not appear to be widely used by management, perhaps as a result of the questionable value of the information they contain. The weekly project reporting forms are not widely used by national management. These forms appear to be of greater value to regional offices by showing whether a project is operating according to plan and what, if any, problems it is encountering.

The monthly project reporting forms are valuable to the directors and senior management of Katimavik. They show expenditures according to budget and allow for efficient cash management. At current interest rates, the difference between good and poor cash management on an annual expenditure of $10,000,000 could easily amount to 2% of total expenditures or $200,000 over the period of a year.

The monthly reports are also valuable to regional office personnel who are able to see how well their region is performing according to plan and by doing so to take appropriate action.

JOB CREATION COSTS AS ALTERNATIVES TO KATIMAVIK

While job creation programs were not compared with Katimavik for program efficiency, it is possible to estimate how much it would cost to fund a direct employment type of program instead of Katimavik. The policy option of spending the funds on other programs is available to government and as a result there are several alternatives to Katimavik. For purposes of this estimation, costs per program day were calculated and then the federal minimum wage was used as an alternative cost factor. This alternative could be funded through different programs including a wage subsidy program helping to pay a subsidy equal to the minimum wage for employees on acceptable public works or municipal projects; an increased number of Canada Works type projects or Local Employment Assistance Projects; or on renewal of incentives similar to the Employment Tax Credit Program.

TABLE 3

KATIMAVIK COST PER PARTICIPANT DAY
(270 days per participant. No value for dropouts)

Year	Participants	Katimavik Costs ($,000,000)	$Cost Per Participant Day Including Co-ordinators and Group Leaders	$Cost per Day at Federal Minimum Wage 7 hrs/day
1	938	8.4	33.16	20.30
2	1,126	9.1	29.95	20.30
3	1,190	10.6	32.99	20.30
4	917	11.1 (est.)	44.83	22.75

In this analysis, participants are defined as including project co-ordinators, group leaders, and project participants all of whom received exposure to the community and the project. If co-ordinators and group leaders are eliminated, the costs per participant day increase to $38.03, $34.46, $37.98 and $52.37 for Years 1 through 4 respectively. For comparisons with minimum wage costs the project co-ordinators and group leaders should also be included as they shared in whatever outputs and contributions the projects made the host communities.

The number of participants is derived from those project participants completing the program plus the number of project co-ordinator and group leader positions. If

people dropped out in the co-ordinator and group leader positions Katimavik replaced them. In effect this total is a measure of the person working the full project year. By not counting the project participant who dropped out, the cost per participant day is calculated at a maximum rate. It would be lower if we added up the number of days spent in the program by all those who dropped out, divided by 270 and included the result in the Participants Column above. For exmaple if 300 dropout participants averaged 75 days each on Katimavik in Year 3, the Cost Per Participant Day would drop from $32.99 to $30.83. Using such calculations better reflects the actual costs per participant day. However, better data are required on the average duration of stay of project participants who fail to complete the program in order to determine these costs.

TABLE 4

ESTIMATED COST OF EMPLOYING PARTICIPANTS,
GROUP LEADERS AND CO-ORDINATORS
AT MINIMUM WAGES

Year	Minimum Wage Costs ($000,000)	Katimavik Costs ($000,000)	Minimum Wage as a $ of Katimavik
1	5.1	8.4	60.7
2	6.2	9.1	68.1
3	6.5	10.6	61.3
4	5.6	11.1	50.4
Total	23.4	39.2	59.6
Including employers' Unemployment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan contributions	24.3	39.2	61.9

The total cost of paying the federal minimum wage to the same number of people as the number of Katimavik participants, group leaders and co-ordinators would have been approximately 60% of the total expenditure on Katimavik. That figure rises to 62% of the Katimavik costs if employers' Unemployment Insurance and Canada Pension Plan contributions are included.

Wage subsidized jobs and jobs provided through the other programs would create entitlement to post-program collection of Unemployment Insurance Benefits in the event that participants were unemployed and in the labour force. If at the expiry of these programs the employees remain unemployed for a 16 - 18 week period and collected an average of $70 per week in Unemployment Insurance the post-program cost would be $4.7 to $5.3 million.

This equals between 12.0% and 13.3% of total Katimavik expenditures. The costs of administering wage subsidy or other employment creation programs plus the costs of administering the Unemployment Insurance entitlement and collection could, based on LEAP, Canada Works and U.I. experience, cost up to 10% of the total amount spent. Adding these percentages to the 61.9% Minimum Wage as a percent of Katimavik produces the following result. The total cost of a government run employment or wage subsidy

program would be less than (between 83.9 and 85.2% of) the cost of Katimavik.

The cost of employing workers at the Fair Wage rate may also be compared to Katimavik. Much of the quantifiable outputs of Katimavik are in physical facilities - buildings, recreation resources and environmental enhancement. The labour provided by the Katimavik participants could have been provided by unskilled or semi-skilled construction workers. An average for the federal and provincial Fair Wage Rates for labourers in rural residential construction (that construction which is not industrial, commercial or investment) is approximately $5.50 per hour for the four years under consideration. The cost of employing labourers at this rate would have been $43.4 million or $4.2 million more than the amount spent on Katimavik. If the value of the output produced by Katimavik construction related activities was equivalent to the value of the product of an equal number of construction labour person-hours, this estimate would suggest that Katimavik is efficient. To adequately address this issue requires an adequate assessment of the value of the physical capital produced by Katimavik labour. The capital assessments provided by the completed Katimavik Capital Improvement Assessment Forms do not provide adequate estimates.

The cost per participant given in Table 3 increased drastically in Year 4 because of the reduced number of projects and the increased attrition rate. Attrition in Year 4 is approximately 50% higher than in the earlier years. If the number of projects were increased to the Year 3 level and the attrition rate similar to the rates of Years 1 through 3, the cost per participant in Year 4 would have been close to the cost in those years. Management has to give careful consideration to what has to be done to reduce attrition and how it can better its record. The main solution suggested by Katimavik was better training for group leaders and co-ordinators. That may not be sufficient as it might only address a limited part of the problem.

Katimavik management felt that more projects and more participants could have been handled in Year 4 with the given level of national and regional management. However, it was not possible to determine to what extent budgetary uncertainties producing doubts as to whether Year 4 would be funded, rather than limited funds may have affected recruiting and attrition.

There are no hard data-based reasons to explain the apparent high dropout rate in Year 4. The mix of participants was not significantly different from earlier years. Alternative employment opportunities or educational

opportunities were not radically different that year so as to attract away participants. The answer might rest with the uncertainty of the program, the lead time available for its promotion and the response to Katimavik's promotion by individuals and communities. It could also be a function of the level of allowance received by the participants. By Year 4 that level might hae been too low in real dollar terms to have much attraction. These factors can be checked by Katimavik management in Year 5.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

Katimavik suffers from a lack of corporate strategy or clearly defined direction for itself. This is not due to Katimavik's management. The management has frequently prepared plans, goals, targets, and directives for Katimavik. Rather, the absence of a strategy is, in the view of the consultant, a function of the multiplicity of authorities to which Katimavik finds itself reporting. By their estimate, Katimavik reports to its Board of Directors and through the Board, operates under the scrutiny of the Secretary of State, the Ministry of State for Social Development, the Auditor General, the Treasury Board, and the public. The priorities and information needs of these various masters are perceived to be different. The changes in reporting authorities over the years may have further hampered Katimavik's ability to communicate its message. Yet no effort

has been made by these agencies to define their common information needs nor even to assess whether they all should have a share in the review and assessment of Katimavik.

In effect Opcan, the Katimavik corporation, is a corporation in name only. In reality it cannot behave like a corporation, nor like a Crown corporation, nor even like a government department. It can neither be profit making nor can it afford the risk of losses. Its year-to-year existence appears in the early program years to have reinforced a strategy of budgeting for an over-expenditure in order to return money to the government each year. It cannot afford to incur losses because as a non-profit corporation it is unable to build up assets against which losses may be deferred. It exists from year to year on an ad hoc basis and thus has no opportunity to conduct long range planning. Planning for Katimavik has been restricted to the development of next year's program plus planning during the ongoing program year. Katimavik has not been able to afford to devote substantial management resources to the formulation of multi-year plans because it is too heavily involved in current operations.

The involvement of Katimavik management with its host of authorities is reflected in the extensive commitment of resources to accounting and statistics gathering. The

presence of two people in each regional office and five people at head office whose jobs can be considered as accounting or information processing is due to two factors. The first is a need to account for and control the corporation's expenditures. This is a legitimate corporate responsibility and one which is carried out well by Katimavik. The books balance, each project's expenditure records are detailed and most reflect the adherence to corporate spending policies. Deviations from accepted practices are picked up quickly and management can exercise its authority to permit these practices to occur (i.e., higher than average and than planned project expenditures due to higher on-site transportation, food or lodging costs) or to take measures to bring the expenditures back into line with the agreed upon levels. The second is the production of data on every aspect of Katimavik. This reflects the desire of management to both keep on top of what is happening within the projects, at a regional level and at the national level; and to have information available to answer any questions which might be put to Katimavik by any of its "authorities".

The extensive financial records of Katimavik appear to be excellent. Financial controls are tight and national and regional headquarters know where their money is being spent. However, not all of the information collected by the

program is of value. Katimavik has amassed a collection of four years of Capital Improvement Assessment Forms and still cannot answer how much additional capital has been formed by Katimavik. A review of the forms shows that they had no clearcut methodology, measures or definitions; were not developed according to what could be considered acceptable accounting or valuation measures; and were not filled out in a consistent manner. They should not be added up to create a measure of the capital benefits produced by the projects. Such results would be subjective and at best reflect the quick and dirty local level assessments done by the projects. They may or may not reflect reality. What is needed before preparing Capital Assessment Forms or aggregated Project Cost and Labour Analysis Reports is a clear sense of why the reports are being prepared. This involves knowing which authority wants the results, what it does with the results, what questions it wants answered, is it aware of the cost of answering the questions in a manner acceptable to it, and will the process for answering the questions be acceptable to other authorities. Even if the forms and the results meet Katimavik's internal needs to understand itself better, they may not be necessary if they meet no clear external information need. The kind of detailed measures which would be satisfactory to a Treasury Board or an Auditor General could be collected but need not necessarily be collected for every project. A sample basis

of communities would be sufficient. In these communities properly defined valuations of physical capital formation could be conducted on a uniform basis. Such a process requires well-trained valuators and is expensive to develop and apply.

Similarly, the weekly report submitted by projects to regional officers may only serve to meet internal needs. They indicate to regional management and then to national management, projects and communities in which problems are occurring. It is possible that changing the nature of this report to an exceptions report rather than a required report could reduce the reporting burden on the project leaders and co-ordinators.

It is to Katimavik's operational advantage to have a clearcut sense of direction. Yet it cannot develop this direction or undertake the necessary associated planning without a longer-term sense of purpose. In a corporation, long-term survival is assumed. A corporation knows that as long as it is able to meet its long-term commitments it can make long-term plans and, hopefully profit from them.

Katimavik has spent over $74,000 on computers and data processing for head office accounting and research purposes. It has not purchased a computer because as a

corporation it has been restricted to a short-term one year planning horizon. Even a medium term planning horizon of three - five years could give Katimavik far more flexibility in planning its activities. It could purchase a small 128-256 K capacity computer (somewhere between a big micro and a full fledged mini-computer) and use it for accounting, mailing, record keeping, and research. Through terminals it could link up with regional offices and better share information, research, and human resources. It could investigate purchasing vehicles and thus reducing some on-site and possibly some inter-project travel costs.

It could formulate longer range objectives regarding community development and select communities for longer-term projects. Measurement of results would be simpler and the projects might be able to provide more oppportunity for local people to participate in the project in their community. Thus recruitment patterns could be altered and greater effort devoted to recruiting Katimavik participants from among host communties.

It was not possible to determine whether the selection of Katimavik had a positive or a negative income or distribution input. The expenditure of public funds on a higher than average proportion of people from lower income backgrounds would be deemed a positive distribution. The

family income background of Katimavik has been gathered by broad income ranges ($0 - $10,000, $10,000 - $15,000, $15,000 - $20,000, $20,000 - $30,000, and over $35,000 per year) which are not directly comparable with other available family income data. Data of this nature are generally unreliable when collected in questionnaires filled out by people who are minor contributors to their family's income. The selection of Katimavik candidates has not been done on the basis of family income. Selection on the basis of language, region, and sex is representative of the population of similar age to Katimavik's population and is an efficient sampling measure for the program. To include other dimensions would require more detailed application forms and a much larger number (perhaps 5 times the current level) of applicants. This might in turn require more extensive, and more expensive advertisement and recruitment of participants.

Management at the national level and regional levels has been criticized as being too top heavy on the accounting side. There was also concern expressed to the consultant in interviews with Katimavik and government officials that Katimavik may have more people on its national and regional staffs than necessary. The ability to plan ahead and work towards a longer range plan when accompanied by reduced data production requirements suggest that Katimavik could operate

with fewer such staff. If accounting and record keeping requirements are reduced and are kept consistent from program year to program year, the consultant felt that Katimavik could reduce staff by up to a total of 6 people in national and regional offices. These resources could be directed towards reducing attrition.

Yet that suggestion does not mean that Katimavik is currently overstaffed nor that its staff are overpaid.

The report Recommendations For A Base Salary Administration Program conducted in 1979 by William M. Mercer Limited for Katimavik shows that the Katimavik salary levels were generally lower than salaries for equivalent jobs examined by Mercer. Reviewing the Mercer results and comparing them with other Mercer data and with data contained in the H. V. Chapman Consulting and Compensation publication Management Compensation in Canada 1979 offer further confirmation that Katimavik salaries at levels from budget control officer positions on up to the executive director position were not excessive. If anything, the levels were generally in the bottom half of the salary range for similar work. Reviewing the job descriptions prepared by Katimavik and comparing them with similar job descriptions and program structures in Quebec provincial government departments and with federal government positions

also shows that the Katimavik scales are in line. However, examining organizational charts and comparing Katimavik with Open House Canada, and Canada World Youth; Katimavik appears to be devoting more human resources to its accounting, record keeping functions. By comparison its senior members are also paid more than those in the above organizations. Particularly in the case of Canada World Youth it appears that the duties of the jobs and levels of responsibility are comparable.

On the basis of the material reviewed by the consultant it appears that staff at Katimavik are receiving less then they might in the outside world and that senior staff at Canada World Youth are underpaid relative to Katimavik. The Operation Beaver size and staff structure are too small for a relative comparison. Open House Canada figures covering only those public servants directly employed on that program also show a lower salary structure than Katimavik. In the case of Open House Canada, the level of responsiblity and the decision-making concerning the program are made by people with a broad range of program responsiblity within Secretary of State. The determination of equity in wage structure such as those set out in federal government policy on equal pay for equal work require comprehensive job evaluations for every job. This type of in-depth job evaluation is the subject of a separate study. The job

descriptions for the above programs generally need to be much more detailed before confirmation can be given to the consultant's view.

The consultant has attempted to compare Katimavik with other similar programs. No identical programs exist but general comparisons are possible. Larger programs than the combined Canada World Youth - Katimavik, for example the Summer Youth Employment Program, are operated with smaller head office staffs. The Outreach Program, is as large as Katimavik and of an equally if not more complete social dimension. It is operated with fewer national and regional staff but program to program comparisons would be misleading. In the case of Katimavik all of the staff and management expenditures at the national and regional offices are clearly identified. The national, regional and district management responsibilities for Outreach are not identified in program expenditures nor in person-year breakdowns of senior management, regional management and local program personnel.

CONCLUSIONS

Katimavik has been a well-managed program. It is concerned with efficiency and with putting its dollars to work in the participating communities. Management is

capable and receptive to suggestions regarding improving efficiency such as reducing paperwork and purchasing computers. Management has over the year substituted telex and telephone use for travel wherever possible. But management and the Board of Directors need to stay in touch with projects and communities in order to retain a good feel for what is happening and in order not to be perceived by the project participants, group leaders and co-ordinators as too remote from project activity. This latter risk is part of the trade-off Katimavik management accepts in trying to increase the proportion of program-related to the total expenditures. At the national level, management has, when not beset by problems of program survival, shown good ability to plan, has developed and put into operation an effective financial control system, and seems prepared to take on the challenge of guiding Katimavik through a multi-year existence. The program can be made more efficient if its attrition rate is reduced to that of the third year. In terms of results Year 3 was a successful sample for Katimavik to target towards in its future.

Katimavik is an efficient program. Its efficiencies are more apparent relative to itself (i.e. internally) than in relation to other programs. It also appears efficient relative to the other programs examined. There is potential

for improvements in efficiency which can be made in Katimavik. Given that it is considered sufficiently effective, and that its aims are still important enough to the government to merit funding, the program should be continued.